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ABSTRACT
The Tax reform Act of 1986 revised the corporate AMT and
explicitly linked corporate taxation to financial
accounting "Book Income". Congress added the book income
adjustment to eliminate highly publicized instances in
which corporations with substantial book income have not
paid tax. The potential impact of this new law on
financial reporting may overshadow its expected revenue
generation benefits. Our results indicated that the new
AMT 1) will affect a greater number of firms than
intended by Congress, and 2) may have little impact on
"abusive firms."
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IS THERE A HOLE IN THE AMT NET?
Introduction
The 1986 Tax Reform Act contained a new alternative
minimum tax (AMT) for corporations. This new tax arose from
a perception on the part of taxpayers and policy makers that
some U.S. corporations do not pay their fair share of income
taxes. These asserted "abusers" report high levels of income
for financial reporting purposes to their stockholders but
pay little, if any, income taxes to the federal government.
The AMT, which contains a new book income adjustment, was
devised by Congress to snare these "abusers" of the corporate
income tax system. However, both the AICPA and FASB
expressed their opposition to the book income adjustment item
because of its potential effect on financial reporting. The
accounting profession questioned the propriety of linking tax
policy to financial reporting policies.
In order to evaluate the new law, the benefits of the
new law must be considered contemporaneously with the
additional social costs associated with the corporate
reactions to the new minimum tax. As corporations seek to
rearrange their asset and capital structures to avoid or
reduce the effect of this new law, they may exert greater
pressure to alter Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) for reasons other than adequate representation of
accounting information. Explicitly linking the computation
of taxable income to financial statement income may produce
social costs which far outweigh the expected benefits of the
new AMT. In addition to its impact on financial reporting,
the new AMT may unfairly tax the economic profits of the
firm. The new AMT lacks any provision that would prevent a
corporation from paying AMT on economic profit which had been
fully subject to regular tax. For example, this result may
occur if any significant expense is recognized in one year
under financial accounting rules but the corresponding
deduction is deferred until a later year. Given the intent
of Congress, evidence regarding the following question needs
to be examined: Is the new AMT, with its book income
adjustment, an effective means of increasing the probability
that a tax abusing firm will pay additional taxes? This
study addresses that question.
Lucke, Eisenach, and Dildine (LED) [1986] investigate
corporate attributes that increase the probability of paying
additional taxes under the new AMT. Their analysis simulates
prototype firms in the retail, durable, non-durable
manufacturing, and air transportation industries. Their
results outline various firm characteristics that increase
the probability of a firm paying additional tax under the new
tax. They conclude that the set of firms that pay the new
AMT is much broader than Congress's original intent.
Although LED suggest that the AMT will impact a broad range
of firms, they provide no insight as to its effectiveness in
taxing "abusing firms".
This study extends LED's results using actual corporate
information from publicly available financial statements.
Using a model based on LED's firm characteristics, we provide
evidence that the new tax may not capture abusing firms and
greatly impacts non-abusing firms. If the new law, with its
book income adjustment, is not effective in taxing the
"abusing firm", policy makers should reconsider its
appropriateness in light of the social costs that may result.
Corporations will probably exert pressure on regulatory
agencies to modify financial reporting methods such that they
are more congruent with tax reporting methods or utilize
methods for financial reporting purposes which are
detrimental to adequate financial reporting.
This study contributes to our understanding of the
impact of the AMT on corporations in three ways. First, we
develop a measure that indicates a firm's "abuse status."
Congress and the taxpaying public has identified "tax
abusing" corporations as those firms that report significant
accounting profits while reporting little or no taxable
income. In discussing the motivation for the AMT, the Joint
Committee on Taxation [reference] stated that " ... in order
to achieve both a real and apparent fairness, Congress
concluded that there must be a reasonable certainty , that
whenever a company publicly reports significant earnings,
that company will pay some tax for the year" (emphasis
added) . Our measure of "abuse status" is based on the
difference between income reported to stockholders and
taxable income and this measure can be computed from publicly
available financial statement data.
Second, this study integrates the results from the
modeling by LED with actual data for firms in the economy.
Since actual income tax data is not available, simulation
studies such as LED's study provide initial insights as to
the effect of new policy decisions. However, it is necessary
to extend those initial insights using publicly available
financial data in order to assess the actual consequences of
the new policy.
Third, since the AMT may introduce additional social
costs that outweigh the perceived revenue benefits, this
study provides some insights into the extent to which those
benefits may be forthcoming. If the AICPA and FASB are
correct about the potential harm to financial statement
reporting and the tax is not successful in capturing
"abusers", then policy makers should consider other tax
alternatives to address the perceived abuse problem.
Evidence provided by this study suggests that the AMT may
have only a minor impact on corporations who are considered
tax abusers.
Our results suggest that as the probability of being an
abusing corporation increases, the probability of paying the
AMT does not correspondingly increase. A prediction model
based on LED's simulation results provides partial support
for using the firm attributes identified by LED to
discriminate between firms that are most likely and least
likely to be tax abusers. However, the prediction model
discriminates between "abusers" and "non-abusers" only
marginally better than a naive model that selects firms based
on the percentage of firms labelled abusing and non-abusing
in the sample. Accordingly, assuming LED's simulation
results are valid, the probability of paying additional tax
under the AMT is not highly correlated with the probability
of being a tax abuser.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section two provides a description of our measure of "abuse
status". Section three provides a review of the LED study
and outlines their suggested characteristics of firms that
will be snagged by the AMT. Section four provides a
description of our results while a summary and our
conclusions are contained in section five.
Measure of "Abuse Status" and Sample of Firms Analyzed
The intent of Congress in developing the alternative
minimum tax was "to ensure that no taxpayer with substantial
economic income can avoid significant tax liability. .." [Joint
Committee on Taxation, p. 432]. The problem Congress tried
to address arose from the public's perception that many major
corporations are able to report significant book income, pay
dividends to their stockholders, and yet pay little or no
income taxes. The Joint Committee [p. 43 3] noted that "The
ability of high-income taxpayers to pay little or no tax
undermines respect for the entire tax system. . . . Even to the
extent that these instances may reflect deferral, rather than
permanent avoidance, of corporate tax liability, Congress
concluded that they demonstrated a need for a change".
Identification of firms which are tax abusers could
ideally be accomplished using corporate tax returns and
publicly available financial statements. With both of these
information sources, identifying abusing firms would only
require comparison of reported taxable income and reported
financial income. Using Congress's definition of abuse,
firms with large differences between these two income numbers
would be classified as abusive. Unfortunately, taxable
income is proprietary information and not readily available.
However, there exists information in the reported financial
statements that may allow an estimate of the size of that
difference and ultimately indicate the firm's "abuse status".
Corporations are required to separately disclose the
provision for taxes on reported book income deferred until
future periods. An analysis of the change in the deferred
taxes account reported on the balance sheet relative to the
amount of income reported to stockholders provides an
indicator of the proportion of current period financial
statement income on which tax payments are deferred into the
future. For example, if a firm has no change in the deferred
taxes account, it has no timing differences and is paying
taxes that approximate the statutory rate on book income
before credits. However, a firm that shows an increase in
deferred taxes is paying less than the statutory rate on book
income in the current year since some of the taxes are being
deferred for payment in the future. For this study, the
change in the deferred taxes account divided by book income
before income taxes is the measure on which the "abuser
status" indicator is based.
In this study, we focus on 1986 corporate annual
financial statements for two reasons (1) many 1987 financial
reports are not currently available, and (2) 1987 financial
reports would represent accounting income after firms may
have attempted to minimize the book income adjustment. Thus,
the 1987 reports would not be an adequate picture of an
abusing firm as perceived by policy makers and the taxpaying
public. While the 1986 financial reports should reasonably
represent a corporation's "abuser status" before the tax
reform, firms' expectations regarding passage of the new AMT
may have prompted them to alter their 1986 financial reports
in preparation for additional adjustments in 1987. However,
since regulations explaining the new law were not issued
until March 1987 [Federal Register, 1987], few firms would
have been able to accurately predict the effects of the new
law in 1986. If firms altered their 1986 financial
statements, a bias against finding any results consistent
with the results of LED's simulation is present.
All non-regulated industry firms on the Compustat Data
Base were searched to determine those for which the requisite
data needed for this study were available. Firms with
negative deferred tax balances (an asset) or negative book
income were excluded from our sample. This resulted in an
initial sample of 952 firms.
The ratio of the change in the deferred tax liability to
book income before taxes was computed for the initial sample
of firms. Note that this measure may be somewhat imprecise
since the deferred taxes account includes both state and
foreign taxes. In addition, this ratio can become quite
large as book income approaches zero. This could result in
firms deferring taxes at greater than the statuatory rate of
46 percent. However, for most firms the domestic federal
income tax is the major component of deferred taxes.
Firms with a high ratio deferred a higher relative
portion of taxes on book income to future periods. Given the
statutory rate of .46, a firm that deferred all of its taxes,
based on the current book income reported to stockholders,
would have a ratio of .46. The firms were then sorted in
descending order based on this ratio. From this listing,
firms in the top quartile and within the general industry
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classification used by LED (165 corporations) , were
designated as "abusers" while a group of 190 firms, in the
same industries, that had little or no change in deferred
taxes were designated to be "non-abusers" . Summary
statistics regarding the ratio of the change in deferred
taxes relative to book income are presented in Table 1.
INSERT TABLE 1
These two groups reasonably exemplify the "abusers" and
"non-abusers" since the "abuser" group, on average, increased
deferred taxes by 51 percent of book income, whereas the
"non-abuser" group had a mean increase in deferred taxes of
only one percent. The "abusers" tended to defer most of the
computed tax on income reported to stockholders. In
addition, given that the average for the "abuser" firm group
had a ratio much greater than 4 6%, the statutory rate, some
of the corporations may have reported a profit to their
stockholders and a loss to the Internal Revenue Service.
Additional evidence regarding the validity of this ratio to
measure "abuser status" is that Citizens for Tax Justice
[1985] identified some of the firms included in the "abuser"
group as corporations that paid no taxes or received a refund
during 1982-1984.
Suggested Attributes of Firms paying the New AMT
Lucke, Eisenbach, and Dildine [1986] determined that
firms paying the new AMT will have the following
characteristics
:
1. Higher Debt
2
.
Higher Growth
3 Lower Profit
The reasons outlined by LED for linking payment of the AMT to
these firm characteristics are the following. Firms with
higher debt will be more likely to pay the AMT because larger
interest payments reduce taxable income and as a result the
book income adjustment will tend to be greater in proportion
to taxable income. Firms that are growing are more likely to
pay the AMT because of the large depreciation preference
generated. Less profitable firms will be more likely to pay
because taxes on taxable income will not increase as fast as
taxes under the AMT even though regular tax rates are higher.
Profitable firms will be less likely to pay taxes under the
AMT because the regular tax will increase faster as taxable
income increases.
For this study, the debt to equity ratio is used to
measure the debt characteristic. This ratio is computed as
total debt divided by total stockholders' equity. The
financial statement item chosen to represent profitability in
our analysis is income before taxes. Growth is measured by
(1) the average change in sales over the ten years prior to
1986, and (2) the average change in book income before taxes
over the ten years prior to 1986. Descriptive statistics for
the total sample of 952 firms, the "abuser" group, and the
10
"non-abuser" group are provided in Table 2.
INSERT TABLE 2
For these two groups, the average debt to equity ratio
is larger for the abuser group. The abuser group also, on
average, is less profitable and has experienced lower growth
in both sales and profits. However, a simple statistical
comparison of the means indicates no significant differences
between the "abuser" and "non-abuser" groups. These
statistical results are not consistent with the results from
LED's simulation where firms with high debt, low
profitability, and high growth were more likely to be subject
to the AMT. This can be attributed to the large variation
among the firms in the two groups on these attributes.
Predictive Model and Analysis
The results of LED's analysis indicates several firm
characteristics that increase the probability of paying the
new AMT. A model developed from LED's analysis is
represented as follows:
P(AMT)
t
= a + (3 xG t + 0^ + (3 2D t + e,
Where:
P(AMT)i = Probability that firm i pays the new AMT;
Gi = Growth of firm i;
P
t
= Profitability of firm i;
Di = Debt/Equity of firm i;
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e t = error term.
Congress expects the new AMT to be effective if there is
a "reasonable certainty" that firms who report substantial
economic income pay some additional tax. Thus, Congress is
attempting to insure that corporate tax abusers pay some tax
under the new AMT even though their regular tax liability may
be zero. In other words, Congress is attempting to increase
P(AMT| Abuser) , the probability that the AMT will be paid
given that the firm is a tax abuser. If the new AMT is
effective in snaring abusers, we expect that P (ABUSER) to be
highly correlated with P(AMT) . Consequently, we examine this
relationship by analyzing how well the factors that determine
P(AMT) also determine P (ABUSER) . For this, the following
model is utilized:
P (ABUSER) £ = a + Q& + (3 2P, + 3D t + e t
Where:
P(ABUSER)i= Probability that firm i is a tax abuser
as defined by Congress;
Gi = Growth in Sales of firm i;
P t = Profitability of firm i
;
Di = Debt/Equity of firm i;
e
A
= error term.
Although our abuse measure is continuous, the
dichotomous representation described in Section 2 is used.
P (ABUSER) equals 1 if the firm is classified as an abuser and
if the firm is in our non-abuser group. Using a
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dichotomous dependent variable introduces problems which
preclude the use of a standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regression analysis. Since E(P(ABUSER)) is the probability
that the ith firm is a tax abuser, it must range from to 1
.
A standard OLS regression model will predict uninterpretable
values from minus to plus infinity. To overcome this
problem, a LOGIT analysis which specifically accounts for the
limits of the dependent variable is used.
The results of the LOGIT analysis conducted on 355
abusing and non-abusing firms (the two groups previously
described) is presented in Table 3.
INSERT TABLE 3
The results provided in Table 3 indicate that the overall
prediction model is statistically significant and it predicts
marginally better than a naive model that selects firms based
on the frequency of each type (Abuser, Non-Abuser) in the
sample. The estimated coefficients for debt and profit have
the predicted sign; however, only the coefficient for debt is
significant. These results, reported in Table 3, provide
partial support for the results of LED's simulation analysis.
However, note that a greater percentage of abusing firms are
misclassif ied than non-abusing firms. This indicates that
the model errs on the side of allowing abusers to go untaxed.
This result is extremely important given that the model
estimation reported in Table 3 is biased in favor of
correctly classifying abusing and non-abusing firms. This
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bias toward correct classification is due to the actual
distribution of corporate taxpayers being unequally divided
between abusing and non-abusing firms. To examine this bias,
a prediction model is estimated in which only the most
extreme abusers (n=3 6) are included in the analysis. A
corporation is considered an extreme abuser if the increase
in deferred taxes relative to book income exceeds 4 6 percent.
The results are presented in Table 4.
INSERT TABLE 4
The overall model is statistically significant but the
signs and significance of the coefficients have changed. The
coefficient for debt has the predicted sign and remains
significant; however, the sign of the coefficients for
profit, growth in sales, and growth in profit are not in the
predicted direction. A naive model that selects firms based
on their frequency in the sample would have a prediction rate
of 84 percent. Accordingly, the suggestion that the model
may not do as well when the distribution of firms in the
sample is closer to the true population is supported. This
model correctly predicts only 2 of the extreme abuser firms.
Consequently, the results suggest that for extreme abusers,
P (ABUSER) is not highly correlated with P(AMT) . Assuming
that LED's analysis is a valid representation of the
likelihood of paying the new AMT, these results imply that
the new AMT does not adequately address the problem of
capturing corporate tax abusers.
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Summary
This paper reports the results of an empirical analysis
intended to determine if the new Alternative Minimum Tax will
have an impact on corporations that fit Congress's
description of a "tax abuser". Corporate financial statement
information is used to develop a measure of a firm's "abuse
status". This measure, based on the difference between
income reported to stockholders and taxable income,
adequately captures firms that have been publicly labelled as
"tax abusers".
Firm characteristics regarding the level of debt,
growth, and profitability, found by Lucke, Eisenbach, and
Dildine [1986] to predict firms likely to pay the AMT, are
tested for their ability to classify firms as "abusers" or
"non-abusers" . Our results partially support LED's work, the
coefficient for the debt/equity characteristic is
statistically significant. However, the large number of
misclassifications by the model suggests that a firm which is
likely to pay the new AMT is not likely to be a tax abuser.
The firm characteristics suggested by LED only marginally
enable the model to predict abusing and non-abusing firms.
This result is particularly striking when we adjust the
sample distribution of abusing and non-abusing firms to be
closer to the true population and focus on extreme abusers.
Our results suggest that the AICPA and FASB have valid
concerns with regard to the impact of the new book income
15
adjustment on financial reporting. The additional social
costs associated with expected changes in financial reporting
may be greater than any expected benefits achieved from the
attempt to tax abusive firms. Policy makers should consider
the additional cost of the AMT given its effectiveness in
addressing the perceived corporate "tax abuse" problem. The
results of this study suggest that it is highly likely that
firms who pay additional tax are not those perceived to be
abusers.
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TABLE 1
Summary Statistics for the
Ratio of Change in Deferred Taxes to Book Income
Total Sample
mean .04
minimum •-11.44
"Abusers"
mean .51
minimum .16
"Non-Abusers"
mean .01
minimum -.03
952 firms
standard deviation .85
maximum
165 firms
11.73
standard deviation 1.16
maximum
190 firms
11.73
standard deviation .02
maximum .04
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics for the Predictor Variables
Firm Attribute
Debt / Equity
Book Income
Before Taxes
(millions)
Average Sales
Growth
(millions)
Total Sample (952 firms)
Standard
Mean
.47
167.07
119.25
Average Income
Before Taxes Growth
(millions) 7.51
Deviation
.18
561.58
305.70
39.48
Minimum Maximum
.04
-2200.0
- 416.9
- 676.2
1.89
8805.0
3494.6
386.9
Firm Attribute
Debt / Equity-
Book Income
Before Taxes
(millions)
Average Sales
Growth
(millions)
Abuser Sample (165 firms)
Standard
Mean
.52
111.33
94.00
Average Income
Before Taxes Growth
(millions) 4.37
Deviation
.19
318.67
162.43
14.29
Minimum Maximum
.06
.19
- 74.8
- 57.1
1.89
1303.0
916.44
71.73
TABLE 2 CONTINUED
Non-Abuser Sample (190 firms)
Standard
Firm Attribute Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Debt / Equity .42 .17 .09 .93
Book Income
Before Taxes
(millions) 189.68 704.64 -2200.0 8805.0
Average Sales
Growth
(millions) 117.32 369.58 - 416.9 3387.6
Average Income
Before Taxes Growth
(millions) 8.65 36.33 - 271.8 333.0
TABLE 3
Cross-sectional Logit Regression
Predicted
Variable Coefficient Sicrn T-Ratio
D 3.3007 + 4.7258
P -0.12511E-03 - -0.3031
Gl 0.13052E-03 + -0.1942
G2 -0.29814E-02 + -0.4308
Constant -1.63548 • -4.7532
Likelihood Ratio Test = 28.4817
Prediction Success = 0.6338
4 D.F.
Classification by Sample
Actual
Non-Abuser Abuser
Non-Abuser 140 80
Abuser 50 85
Legend
D = Debt/Equity.
P = Book Income.
Gl = Average Change in Sales for 10 years.
G2 = Average Change in Profit for 10 years.
TABLE 4
Cross-sectional Logit Regression Based on Extreme Abusers
Predicted
Variable Coefficient S iqn T-Ratio
D 4.5512 + 3.9773
P 0.47290E-03 - 0.8629
Gl -0.16021E-02 + -1.9775
G2 -0.82062E-02 + -0.9748
Constant -3.7748 ->• -6.4473
Likelihood Rat io Test = 20.3774 4 D.F.
Prediction Success = 0.84071
Classification by Sample
Actual
Non-Abuser Abuser
Non-Abuser 188 34
Abuser 2 2
Legend
D = Debt/Equity.
P = Book Income.
Gl = Average Change in Sales for 10 years.
G2 = Average Change in Profit for 10 years.
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